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A Constantly Variable "Entropy Mechanism" for Verifying BitTorrent ...


aspadistra

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This is a posing of ongoing IT research, as at this point some feedback is needed to get the final bugs out.

A Constantly Variable "Entropy Mechanism" for Verifying BitTorrent Clients

http://hireme.geek.nz/entropy-mechanism-for-thin-client-verification.html

[...]

In North America many large ISP networks (like the Microsoft Network, but the Facebook network is no different) are subject to ~99% traffic interception mainly from the ECHELON system. BitTorrent traffic has no strategic or military value, and probably never will -- because of the bizarre ways BitTorrent technologies work. However, there are issues beyond the copyright and trademark system [in the parts of the world influenced by Europe] that are not helping the Internet.

There are private companies with mini-ECHELON interception systems that do nothing but track BitTorrent traffic. This unwarranted interception leads to many false accusations of copyright violation, via the ISP. This arrangement can only lead to further civil rights abuses in future. Forcing ISPs to be fully knowledgeable about the traffic they carry is a fool's errand, because the Internet has hundreds of secure protocols.

Specifically, in the case of Australia, Canada and New Zealand (and parts of the European Union) the civil society state of the Internet is not healthy for cultural reasons.

-- A US run "copyright mafia" has been paying off parliamentarians to write laws (and sign treaties) for the past 20 years that not only directly damage the cultural sovereignty of these nations but make further assertions of national sovereignty difficult to impossible.

-- The US never buys programming or music from Europe, Australasia or anywhere else in the Americas. This deeply racist and corrupt exclusionary practice should be enough to guarantee no enforcement of US copyright laws outside US borders.

BitTorrent describes over 20 computer protocols, and at least one primary and 5 ancillary file formats. BitTorrent (as a technology) is mess that very few BitTorrent clients (and trackers) have managed to tame. Yet, in spite of ongoing technological problems at least 20% of global Internet traffic is BitTorrent -- for the simple reason that no other protocol can allow one to download files reliably over the Internet.

Simply by excluding BitTorrent clients via a verification mechanism (implying that the client is controlled by a real person), normal BitTorrent traffic patterns on the Internet may return hopefully freer from unwarranted interception.

[...]

A low complexity (and low bandwidth) "Virtual Machine" (VM) is needed for this to work.

ALL VM TRANSACTIONS MUST TAKE PLACE IN A SECURE TUNNEL.

Each VM communication must provide a Version Number and an "out of band" set of hashsums to verify the VM state machine has been transmitted properly. The VM code itself must contain internal checksums and hashsums for integrity verification. The VM instructions should contain their own parity bits.

[...]

State machine (client to tracker website, bad client notification)

Inevitably, the bad clients and bad networks (or at least bad IP addresses) will be sorted out by this kind of approach by about 3 to 4 months after this verification medthod is manditory.

However, ongoing verification to the tracker websites will be needed indefinitely. This is assisted by the fact that clients do communcate with private trackers on an ongiong basis -- to indicate how much has been transferred per file cumulitivly or recently. Currently BitTorrent has no formally standardized state machine for Tracker-Client communications. The BitTorrent Tracker-Client protocols are not many, but with a small amount of reuse and re-configuration of the existing protocols there is room.

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